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The Law of Deliberative Democracy, by Ron Levy and Graeme Orr
Abstract

The Law of Deliberative Democracy, written by Ron Levy, a senior lecturer at the Australian National
University, and Graeme Orr, a professor of law at the University of Queensland, has broken critical new
ground in the practical application and expansion of deliberative democratic theory. The core concept for
deliberative democrats is that the exercise of political power is only legitimate when it is justified by
conversation and consensus with a broad range of citizens. With this book, Levy and Orr examine the degree
to which the laws of politics measure up with the ideals of deliberative democracy, as well as how and why
they should. In doing so, the authors ask an important question: To what extent does election law––the body
of laws regulating parties, candidates, voters, and other actors involved in representative elections––encourage
or inhibit deliberation, by the citizenry, about the mechanics of their democracy?
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Book Review

The Law of Deliberative Democracy, by
Ron Levy and Graeme Orr1
TANYA KUZMAN2
THE LAW OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY, written by Ron Levy, a senior lecturer

at the Australian National University, and Graeme Orr, a professor of law at
the University of Queensland, has broken critical new ground in the practical
application and expansion of deliberative democratic theory. The core concept
for deliberative democrats is that the exercise of political power is only legitimate
when it is justified by conversation and consensus with a broad range of citizens.3
With this book, Levy and Orr examine the degree to which the laws of politics
measure up with the ideals of deliberative democracy, as well as how and why
they should. In doing so, the authors ask an important question: To what
extent does election law––the body of laws regulating parties, candidates,
voters, and other actors involved in representative elections––encourage or
inhibit deliberation, by the citizenry, about the mechanics of their democracy?
By analyzing deliberation from this perspective, Levy and Orr have skillfully
bridged the disciplines of political science, political theory, and the law, carving

1.
2.
3.

(New York: Routledge, 2016).
Tanya Kuzman holds a JD from Osgoode Hall Law School. She attained her Master’s degree
in Political Science from the University of Toronto and her undergraduate degree from
McMaster University.
See generally Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory
of Law and Democracy, translated by William Rehg (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of
Technology Press, 1996); Amy Gutmann & Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement
(Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1996).
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out a previously unexplored field of study that forces the reader to confront the
law itself as an institution capable of bringing deliberative democracy to fruition.
In part one, the authors begin by explaining the historical tension between
governance seen as either deliberative, meaning inclusive, cooperative, reflective,
and capable of generating intelligent law and public policy, or democratic,
signifying the widespread participation of the citizenry in the creation and
dispensation of law.4 Rarely, they explain, has governance been simultaneously
seen as both deliberative and democratic. Through invoking the early work of
Aristotle and J.S. Mill, the authors demonstrate the degree to which this divide is
deeply entrenched in the work of political theorists, academics, and legal scholars.5
Furthermore, the authors use part one to explore the intersection between law and
politics. Levy and Orr shrewdly point out that judicialization and juridification of
politics has led to extensive scholarship on how democratic institutions can shape
deliberation to yield more trusted governance, but that the existing literature has
generally failed to consider the law itself as an institution within the deliberative
democratic landscape.6 This is a critical and novel aspect of the book. Existing
deliberativists have focused on examining the legitimacy of laws by investigating
the extent to which deliberation was a factor in their creation.7 What Levy and
Orr focus on is the role of the law itself in determining the deliberative quality of
democratic decision making.8 This gap in the discourse, coupled with the critical
tension between visions of governance as either democratic or deliberative, forms
the backdrop against which the authors’ arguments unfold.
As the authors lay out the theory of deliberative democracy, the reader is
given a proverbial tool box to be used in tackling the book’s remaining chapters.9
In addition, the authors discuss the various rationales for pursuing deliberative
democratic decision making, as well as the criticisms and ambiguities that still
haunt the theory.10 This section is also used to orient the reader by discussing
the sites of decision making in which the book’s analysis is focused, such as
4.
5.
6.

Levy & Orr, supra note 1 at 3-5.
Ibid.
The judicialization of politics refers to an increasing reliance on the courts to address
questions about public policy and political controversies. The juridification of politics refers
to the proliferation of formal, rational legal systems in western societies. See generally Ran
Hirschl, “The Judicialization of Politics” in Keith E Whittington, R Daniel Kelemen &
Gregory A Caldeira, eds, Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2008); Levy & Orr, supra note 1 at 5-6.
7. Levy & Orr, supra note 1 at 7-8.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid at 21-24.
10. Ibid at 25-29.
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campaigning, voting, and deliberating in elections.11 What makes Levy and
Orr’s book so captivating, however, is not just how skillfully they outline the
conceptual theory of deliberative democracy, or the comprehensiveness of
their justification for actively pursuing its grand normative goals, but rather, its
ability to methodically dispel well-established critiques claiming that the law of
politics is not consistent with deliberative democratic theory. For example, while
deliberatively democratic decisions should emerge from systems that broadly
survey the views of affected participants, judicial deliberation is practiced mainly
in isolation, making it difficult to meet the theory’s democratic demands.12 Other
critics have argued that entrenched partisan polarization makes achieving the
theory’s hallmarks of cooperation and informed consent extremely challenging.13
However, the authors rise to the challenge in responding to these critiques by
unpacking what they feel are the true barriers to aligning the law of politics with
deliberative democratic ideals.
Throughout the remainder of the book, Levy and Orr call the reader’s
attention to the law of politics’ real deliberative problem, which is that of
the design or practice of law, whereby courts favour methods that too often
generate less deliberative reasoning. This is perhaps most apparent in the way
judges use the principle of proportionality in legal reasoning. The fulcrum upon
which the rest of the book pivots is Levy and Orr’s claim that proportionality
often creates a false dichotomy between deliberation and the more dominant
values of liberty, equality, and integrity in the law of politics (these three values,
respectively, encompass the three remaining chapters of the book, exclusive of
the conclusion).14 The authors substantiate these claims by looking at a range of
case studies from regulating polling data to truth in political campaigns, public
broadcasting of campaign pledges, and gerrymandering.15 Ultimately, Levy and
Orr conclude that when judges adopt “thicker” readings of the values of liberty,
equality, and integrity, they allow for a reconciliation with deliberation such that
these values become mutually supportive rather than eclipsing one another.16
They then examine the relationship between equality and the proposed value
of deliberation. The authors explain that, when judges try to make decisions to
either maintain or bring about political equality, they typically see the principle as
11. Ibid at 25-36.
12. Ibid at 45-46. See generally John Parkinson, Deliberating in the Real World: Problems of
Legitimacy in Deliberative Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) at 1-21.
13. Levy & Orr, supra note 1 at 45-46.
14. Ibid at 60-61.
15. Ibid at 86-108, 128-35, 149-81.
16. Ibid at 60-61.
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operating between competing political parties, political candidates, or individual
voters themselves. However, Levy and Orr argue that this represents a “thin”
conception of equality, one that unnecessarily casts deliberation as a value against
which equality must be balanced. The case study focusing on the legal regulation
of campaign speech proves insightful. Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v
Commonwealth, the Australian High Court’s free expression case, concerned a
law mandating publicly-funded broadcast airtime for political parties.17 The law
granted free television airtime to candidates to deliver speeches about policy,
untainted by visual distraction. The law also banned alternative forms of paid
political broadcast advertising during campaigns. The court struck down the law,
in part, because 90 per cent of the broadcast time was allocated for the parties
already represented in parliament, with the remainder of time being allocated for
parties without any incumbent members.18 Levy and Orr argue that, in doing
so, the court mistakenly characterized the most pressing equality issue as being
unequal division of time between established and developing parties.19 If left in
place, the legislative scheme had the potential to realize significant deliberative
goals, including an exchange of the typically short and shallow stump speeches
for more substantive policy explanations. Therefore, Levy and Orr suggest, had
the court been mindful of deliberation and equality, it would have upheld the law,
possibly recommending modifications to rectify concerns about time allocation
between the parties.20 With this case study, Levy and Orr demonstrate how the
court’s “thin” view of equality underestimated the law’s broader deliberative
potential by conceptualizing equality as a balance between political parties, rather
than a gateway to more robust discussion of policy choices.21
Finally, the authors deal with partisanship and the unethical use of power for
political gain. Levy and Orr propose a “guidance” model for decision making,
which they claim is capable of meeting deliberative goals, while avoiding at least
some of the chronic coercion in democratic politics.22 The authors posit that the
model helps to account for how, beginning in the early 1960s, the Federal Electoral
Boundary Commissions rapidly eradicated a history of partisan gerrymandering
in Canada.23 Levy and Orr use the concept of “thick” integrity to connote the
17. Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth, [1992] HCA 45, 177 CLR 106; Levy
& Orr, supra note 1 at 128-35.
18. Ibid at 128.
19. Ibid at 128-29
20. Ibid at 130.
21. Ibid at 129.
22. Ibid at 164.
23. Ibid at 164-70.
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kind of decision making recommended by the model—that being well-sourced
and reflective of relevant arguments rooted in rational methodologies.24
Ultimately, the authors rightly point out that, while the law cannot compel
behavior in keeping with “thick” integrity, embracing the guidance model can
lead to decisions that have the capacity to entrench deliberation into the law,
thereby ensuring more decisions are made with integrity.25
The Law of Deliberative Democracy is an extremely well-written work which
presents the reader with a novel lens through which to understand the role of the
law as an institution capable of making deliberative democracy a reality. Levy
and Orr’s prescriptions for adjustments to judicial reasoning chart a previously
unmarked path to reconciliation between the values of liberty, equality, integrity,
and deliberation. Their success is due, in large part, to the space and time they devote
to explaining and re-explaining their arguments in engaging ways. For anyone
intrigued by the discourse concerning the intersection between law, politics, and
democracy, this book equips the reader with the conceptual tools to optimistically
imagine and perhaps even work towards a truly deliberative democracy.

24. Ibid at 60-61.
25. Ibid at 180-81.

